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“I	  will	  jump	  into	  the	  river	  to	  save	  two	  brothers	  or	  eight	  cousins”:	  This	  famous	  quote	  	  by	  J.	  B.	  S.	  
Haldane	   accurately	   anticipates	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   cooperation	   is	   the	   favorable	   choice	   in	   an	  
interaction	  between	  genetic	   relatives.	   The	   general	   condition	   can	   later	  be	   formulated	  as	   a	   surprisingly	  
simple	   mathematical	   expression,	   known	   as	   the	   Hamilton’s	   rule,	   stating	   that	   natural	   selection	   favors	  
cooperation	   if	   the	  genetic	   relatedness	   (r)	  between	  the	  donor	  and	  the	  recipient	  of	  a	  cooperative	  act	   is	  
greater	  than	   its	  cost	   (c)	   to	  benefit	   (b)	  ratio	  [1]:	  r	  >	  c/b.	  Motivated	  by	  Hamilton’s	  elegant	  early	  studies,	  	  
researchers	   have	   attempted	   to	   find	   simple	   and	   concise	   rules	   that	   characterize	   the	   conditions	   for	  
cooperation	   to	  be	   selected	  under	   various	   social	   viscosity	   [2,	   3].	   For	  example,	   the	   seminal	  work	  by	  M.	  
Nowak	  [3]	   in	  2006	  shows	  that	  similarly	  simple	  rules	  can	  be	  derived	  that	  govern	  each	  of	  the	  other	  four	  
popular	   mechanisms	   of	   cooperation—direct	   reciprocity,	   indirect	   reciprocity,	   group	   selection	   and	  
network	   reciprocity—,	  which	   can	   be	   expressed	   via	   the	   cost-­‐to-­‐benefit	   ratio	   being	   smaller	   than	   some	  
critical	  value	  associated	  with	  the	  mechanism	  at	  work	  (as	  seen,	   for	  kin	   interactions,	   the	  critical	  value	   is	  
relatedness).	   However,	   these	   rules	   are	   restricted	   to	   the	   donor	   and	   recipient	   (D&R)	   paradigm.	   The	  
question	   is	  thus	  whether	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  simple	  rules	  even	  for	  the	  general	  case?	  The	  answer	   is	  
not	  trivial	  as	  a	  general	  two-­‐player	  game	  is	  described	  by	  four	  independent	  parameters,	  	  not	  just	  two	  as	  	  
in	  the	  D&R	  game.	  	  
The	   excellent	   review	   by	   Wang	   et	   al.	   [2]	   precisely	   	   addresses	   this	   question,	   capturing	   recent	  
approaches	   and	   their	   pitfalls,	   and	   furthermore,	   proposing	   a	   novel	   approach	   tackling	   the	   pitfalls.	   	   The	  
authors	  show	  that,	  using	  a	  new	  set	  of	  two	  scaling	  parameters	  (see	  precise	  definitions	  of	  Dg‘	  and	  Dr‘	   in	  
Equation	   (6)	   of	   the	   review),	   one	   can	   consistently	   characterize	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	   emergence	   and	  
stability	  of	  cooperation	  in	  the	  general	  pairwise	  game	  when	  social	  viscosity	  is	  introduced	  through	  any	  of	  
the	   five	   aforementioned	  mechanisms.	   	   Using	   theoretical	   analysis	   and	   simulations,	   the	   validity	   of	   the	  
approach	   is	   demonstrated	   for	   both	   finite	   and	   infinite,	   well-­‐mixed	   populations,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   various	  
updating	   rules	   in	   structured	  populations.	  As	   such,	   the	   authors	   have	  proved	   that	   the	  new	  approach	   is	  
better	  than	  all	  existing	  ones	  as	  the	  latter	  fail	  to	  produce	  consistent	  results	  when	  either	  social	  viscosity	  or	  
population	   structure	   is	   considered.	   	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   	   that	   all	   existing	   approaches	   reduce	   the	   four	  
parameter	   set	   that	   defines	   the	   general	   game	   to	   a	   reduced	   set	   of	   two	   scaling	   parameters.	   As	   an	  
application	  of	  the	  newly	  introduced	  approach,	  the	  authors	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  paradox	  of	  cooperation	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benefits,	   suggested	   by	  Németh	   and	   Takács	   [4],	   can	   be	   convincingly	   resolved	   by	   simply	   applying	   their	  	  
parameters	  scaling.	  	  
The	   advantages	   of	   having	   a	   unified	   characterization	   that	   promises	   consistent	   results	   across	  
different	  modeling	  scenarios,	  are	  numerous.	  Typically,	  a	  theoretical	  model	  of	  evolution	  of	  cooperation	  
focuses	  on	  resolving	  a	  single	  cooperation	  dilemma,	  and	  very	  often,	  a	  simplified	  parameterization	  of	  the	  
payoff	  matrix	  is	  adopted	  (mostly	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  convenient	  analysis).	  It	  is	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  judge	  the	  
validity	  of	  such	  a	  model	  in	  the	  general	  context,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  to	  compare	  results	  across	  models	  
and	  even	  across	  analytical	   tools	  and	  methods.	  Adopting	  a	  unified	  characterization	   framework,	  such	  as	  
the	  one	  proposed	  by	  Wang	  et	  al.,	  would	  clearly	  facilitate	  such	  a	  problem.	  Secondly,	  the	  characterization	  
may	   also	   benefit	   more	   theoretical	   analysis,	   for	   instance,	   where	   properties	   of	   equilibrium	   points	   in	   a	  
general	  evolutionary	  game	  with	  random	  payoff	  matrices	  are	  studied	  [5-­‐7],	  	  since	  in	  this	  case,	  all	  possible	  
social	  dilemmas	  can	  occur.	  Finally,	  as	  a	  unified	  conceptual	  framework,	  it	  would	  enable	  a	  convenient	  and	  
cross-­‐domain	   analysis	   of	   various	   practical	   applications,	   ranging	   from	   traffic	   flows,	   swarm	   robotics,	  
resource	  allocation,	  to	  behavioral	  epidemiology	  (see	  references	  in	  [2]),	  in	  which	  solutions	  for	  population	  
cooperation	  have	  proven	  useful.	  	  
The	   important	  steps	  made	  to	  date	  are	  nicely	  captured	   in	  the	  review	  by	  Wang	  et	  al.	   [2],	  which	  
provides	   much	   inspiration	   and	   references	   for	   those	   who	   wish	   to	   dwell	   into	   this	   fascinating	   line	   of	  
research.	  Yet,	  much	  space	  for	  improvements	  and	  future	  advancements	  can	  be	  envisaged	  (next	  to	  the	  co-­‐
evolution	  and	  multi-­‐player	  games	  issues	  already	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  review).	  First,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  
to	  study	  the	  validity	  of	  Wang	  et	  al.	  approach	  for	  other	  mechanisms	  of	  cooperation,	  such	  as	  punishment	  
and	  reward	  [8].	  The	  former	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  as	  human	  decision	  making	  seems	  to	  differ	  between	  
cooperation	  dilemmas	  with	  and	  without	  punishment	  (see	  for	  instance	  the	  recent	  behavioral	  experiment	  
in	  [9]).	  	  Second,	  while	  much	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  different	  social	  viscosity	  in	  the	  literature,	  very	  
few	  efforts	   have	  been	  made	   to	   study	  how	   individual	   cognition	  may	   impact	   the	  outcome	  of	   evolution	  
dynamics	   and	   population	   cooperation	   levels	   [10-­‐13].	   Hence,	   it	  would	   be	   important	   to	   look	   at	   unified	  
characterizations	  from	  an	  individual	  cognition	  perspective,	  as	  well	  as	  across	  cognitive	  skills.	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